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DISPUTING SECURITY AND RISK
The convoluted politics of uncertainty
Helena Farrand Carrapico, Narzanin Massoumi,  
William McGowan and Gabe Mythen
Introduction
Uncertainty has become a prevalent, but arguably oblique, signifier in recent years, 
with economic crisis, climate emergency and the threat of terrorism contributing 
to a tangible – yet simultaneously free- floating – sense of incertitude. To speak in 
the abstract about ‘uncertainty’ in such politically charged times is thus problem-
atic. In this chapter, we argue for a grounded, context- specific account of uncer-
tainty, drawing on vignettes that enable us to think practically about the nature of 
uncertainty and to explore the ways in which incertitude connects to other polit-
ical, cultural and economic processes and forces. We will grapple with the impacts 
of discourses of uncertainty in three areas: cyber security, counter- terrorism and 
coping mechanisms in the aftermath of structural violence. It is our intention not 
only to engage with, but moreover to problematise, dominant understandings of 
‘risk’ and ‘security’ in each of these domains. Elucidating salient problems and issues, 
our intention is to be forthright in challenging settled assumptions around the 
nature of uncertainty, and also its pervasiveness. Counselling against conceptual 
overreach, we contend that the explanatory power of more traditional sociological 
frames of analysis – such as power, ideology and social control – should not be 
marginalised by the omnipresence of debates about uncertainty.
In order to tease out the political dimensions of uncertainty, as they intersect 
with issues of risk and security, we turn first to the case of cyber security, with a 
specific emphasis on the implications of the UK’s exit from the European Union 
for the regulation of future UK– EU security relations. From here, we explore fur-
ther the mobilisation of uncertainty as a lever for politics and policy, focusing on 
the deleterious effects of pre- emptive anti- terrorism and counter- radicalisation 
measures in the UK. Finally, we reflect on survivors’ accounts of managing uncer-
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In order to organise our discussion we direct attention to two key themes that 
cut across and cement together research undertaken by the chapter contributors 
in these three areas. These relate, in turn, to governance, power and accountability, 
and the ideological mobilisation of uncertainty. In prioritising these themes we 
highlight some of the ways in which states engage with situations of ‘not- knowing’ 
and illuminate the ways in which political elites are able to harness the politics of 
uncertainty not only as a mode of governance, but also as a means of bolstering 
social control. These topics constitute central problems for modern nation states, 
with efforts to counter them commanding a sizeable amount of political energy, 
large tranches of public expenditure and considerable material resources for the 
police, criminal justice system and intelligence services. The UK government’s 
National Risk Register – which assesses large- scale threats – considers the threat 
of cyber and terrorist attacks as ‘high’, both in terms of likelihood of occurrence 
and severity of impact. In relation to cyber security, the frequency and the scale 
of attacks continues to proliferate. Given enhanced connectivity between digital 
systems, there is a clear possibility of attacks of greater magnitude, with public and 
private sector organisations considered to be ‘at risk’ (see National Risk Register of 
Civil Emergencies 2017: 63). There is, of course, discernible overlap between cyber 
security and national security – especially given instances of attacks designed to 
destabilise military and intelligence – with both organised groups and lone individ-
uals who are committed to violence seeking to launch cyber- attacks that destabilise 
state security and disrupt processes of capital accumulation. Further, widespread 
concerns have been expressed in political discourse and policy about the emer-
gence of new types of terrorist violence:
Many of those networks and individuals who are judged to pose a terrorist 
threat share an ambition to cause large numbers of casualties without 
warning. Some have aspirations to use non- conventional weapons such as 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances. Others aspire to 
attack our national infrastructure using both traditional methods and more 
novel methods such as electronic attack (National Risk Register of Civil 
Emergencies 2017: 26).
Given pronounced institutional anxieties, it is unsurprising that the current UK 
threat level for international terrorism – set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre – 
is classified as ‘substantial’, meaning that an attack is ‘highly likely’. While framing 
matters of security in this way may incline us to an understanding of risk and 
uncertainty that is slanted towards institutional regulation determined by expert 
systems, such a proclivity may encourage a somewhat partial view. The state has a 
formal duty to protect citizens from harm through implementing protective pol-
icies and practices, but risk and uncertainty are also lived and experienced by indi-
viduals in the course of everyday life. As we shall argue, risks and uncertainties are 
not naturally occurring, flat and horizontal phenomena; rather, they emerge in spe-
cific locales under particular political, economic and cultural conditions (McGowan 
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affect different people to different degrees and in different ways. As Ian Scoones 
(2019: 4) reasons, extant forms of stratification – such as gender, class, ethnicity and 
age – are salient factors in understanding the uneven impacts of uncertainty.
Governing cyber security: competing narratives
The first section of the chapter, led by Helena Farrand Carrapico, explores the gov-
ernance of Brexit uncertainty in the context of cyber security policy. Cyber security 
is considered to be an intensely uncertain field, with ever- increasing levels of attacks 
on information systems and their users being reported (EC 2018). Not only is 
cyber insecurity understood as affecting the daily running of societal infrastructures 
and citizens’ lives, it is also construed as having the potential to undermine funda-
mental rights, democracy and the rule of law: ‘malicious cyber activities not only 
threaten our economies and the drive to the Digital Single Market, but also the 
very functioning of our democracies, our freedoms and our values’ (EC 2017: 2). 
Nowadays, ‘cyber security is about defending our way of life’ (UK National Cyber 
Security Centre 2019:  1). This potential for harm has been framed as an exist-
ential form of uncertainty that is often associated with societal dependence on 
fast- evolving technology, mass production of personal digital data, anonymity of 
attackers and a lack of technical knowledge and resilience among the public. It is 
also portrayed as a pervasive type of uncertainty, with cyber- attacks presented as 
affecting all levels of society, from large companies to state infrastructure and the 
general public (EC and HREU 2013).
Given the discursive context, it is easy to understand why the current threat 
level has been flagged as a major concern at international, European and national 
levels (UK National Cyber Security Centre 2019), and also why cyber security 
has, in recent years, jumped to the forefront of many political and business 
agendas (Carrapico and Barrinha 2017). It is equally unsurprising that EU citi-
zens’ perceptions of cyber security and their attitudes towards internet security 
have changed considerably, with a recent poll indicating that 79 per cent of those 
surveyed believed that the risk of becoming a victim of cyber- crime is increasing 
(EC 2019). The framing of cyber security as a deeply uncertain field has enabled 
a wide range of actors, including both state and private actors, to propose and 
apply a range of policies directed towards addressing cyberspace- calculated risks. 
This process has been particularly evident within the EU, with uncertainty being 
used as one of the key justifications for the introduction and development of a joint 
macro- level cyber security policy and strategy (EC and HREU 2013). Given the 
borderless nature of cyber- attacks, closer cooperation between EU member states 
has been presented as the logical answer to the uncertainties of cyberspace.
The governance of Brexit, following the 2016 EU membership referendum, has 
introduced new forms of complexity in an already uncertain field, with business 
and practitioner concerns being vocally articulated (Harcup 2019). The main diffe-
rence between ‘new’ forms of uncertainty and cyber security emanates from the 
idea that Brexit constitutes a step into the complete unknown. Whereas cyber 
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and insurable, the Brexit process brings considerable uncertainty to the sector. The 
rupture in the relationship between the EU and the UK triggered by Brexit means 
that the full consequences of the process on both the sector and the wider economy 
are unpredictable and largely unknown (see Anan 2019). The lack of historical, pol-
itical and legal reference points reinforces uncertainties and serves to render the task 
of imagining post- Brexit futures necessarily speculative.
In practice, the governance of Brexit has resulted, above all, in a crisis of know-
ledge, which in turn has led to a crisis in decision- making. More specifically, incer-
titude in this case has both political and operational dimensions. Operationally, 
Brexit is likely to disrupt seriously, if not to interrupt entirely, the flow of cyber 
security- related information regularly exchanged by national authorities respon-
sible for countering online threats (Stevens and O’Brien 2019). Regarding the 
explicitly political dimensions, Brexit has the potential to damage the UK’s repu-
tation as a key policy entrepreneur in cyber security. As an EU outlier post- Brexit, 
the UK is likely to have limited or no access to EU institutions and agencies. In 
addition, even if the UK is able to secure a degree of access, it will not be allowed 
to take part in decision- making, including involvement in voting processes. Clearly, 
Brexit has the potential to reduce the levels of trust that the UK– EU relation-
ship has previously benefited from and which has enabled strategic and operational 
cooperation to flow in the field of cyber security (Carrapico et al. 2019).
The practitioner- led narratives on uncertainty recounted above have, however, 
not circulated without contest or challenge. As part of the UK government’s process 
of negotiating an exit from the EU, considerable political efforts have been put into 
creating a counter- narrative that emphasises that the UK and the EU will continue 
to exchange cyber security- related intelligence and that the UK will still be able to 
shape EU standards and incident responses, as other formal and informal channels 
can be used to cooperate in cyber security beyond the EU, including the Five Eyes 
framework and NATO:  ‘pretty much everything we do now to help European 
partners, and what you do to help us, on cyber security can, should, and I  am 
confident, will, continue beyond Brexit’ (Martin, cited in Ashford 2019). Whatever 
the upshot of Brexit in the domain of cyber security, such narratives and counter- 
narratives demonstrate competing ways in which uncertainty is not only under-
stood but, moreover, is being ideationally massaged to suit particular political and 
economic ends. The fact that this is a nascent – but increasingly vital – policy field 
allows us to observe some of the ways in which discourses of certainty and uncer-
tainty are created and disseminated. In addition, a critical analysis of the cyber risks 
triggered by Brexit enables us to envision how these discourses are co- produced 
and mutually responsive, as each jostles to become the dominant and commonly 
accepted security narrative.
Counter- terrorism: the strategic exploitation of uncertainties
In this section, Narzanin Massoumi discusses the strategic exploitation of uncer-
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focusing primarily on the relationship between government and two sets of non- 
governmental actors that played a significant role in delivering and developing 
anti- terrorism initiatives. The first set of actors are state- supported civil society 
organisations that rely on government support through funding, institutional access 
and other resources. In the first iteration of Prevent, such organisations were overtly 
linked to the government and included agencies like the Quilliam Foundation 
(now Quilliam). Following a shift in strategy from 2011 onwards, the government 
adopted a set of discreet relations with a new set of state- supported organisations 
in order to compensate for previous failures in gaining legitimacy. The second 
key group of actors are neo- conservative think tanks – such as the Henry Jackson 
Society – which have successfully lobbied for changes in government policy in this 
area. As we shall see, these non- governmental organisations have played a significant 
role in supporting and enacting Prevent. The publicly autonomous nature of these 
organisations means that they are not subjected to official forms of scrutiny, raising 
to the fore issues of power and accountability.
The Prevent strategy was devised in 2003 under the presiding Labour govern-
ment, but was formally launched in 2007 following the ‘7/ 7’ London bombings. 
The strategy is underpinned by the presumption that the roots of politically and 
religiously motivated violence lie in the propagation of ‘extremist’ ideas – in other 
words, that a continuum operates that stretches from initial adoption of radical 
ideas through to committing acts of terrorism. Prevent is based on pre- emptive 
principles and serves as a ‘pre- crime’ measure, designed to promote early interven-
tion to avert later occurrence of harm. While the Prevent strategy seeks to model 
future threats by identifying indicators of vulnerability to extremist ideology and 
‘drivers’ of violent behaviour, its design, implementation and impacts have been 
widely criticised since its inception (Mythen et al. 2017; Kundnani 2009; 2015; 
Dodd 2009). In the first iteration of the Prevent strategy, the stated objective was to 
‘work with Muslim communities to isolate, prevent and defeat violent extremism’ 
(DCLG 2007). As a result, there was a concerted drive to fund Muslim civil society 
organisations – via the Department for Communities and Local Government – 
that would work directly on tackling ‘violent extremism’. This saw the largest 
ever injection of funding into Muslim civil society in the UK, with £60 million 
being directed to ‘third sector’ agencies to counter extremism (O’Toole et  al. 
2013). At the same time, Prevent funding was controversially allocated to local 
authorities on the basis of the proportion of Muslims living in the locale (Mythen 
et al. 2017; Kundnani 2009). While ‘capacity building’ initiatives were focused on 
empowering Muslim minority communities, the government’s drive to recruit 
partners to assist in the counter- terrorism agenda proved difficult. The Prevent 
programme faced widespread criticism from human rights groups, academics and 
activists for being selective in its engagement with Muslim groups and excluding 
those critical of UK foreign policy or domestic counter- terrorism measures. The 
strategy was also criticised for its heavy policing of civil society organisations and 
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Following a review conducted by the then independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation, David Anderson QC, the Conservative/ Liberal Democrat coalition gov-
ernment issued a second iteration of Prevent in 2011 (HM Government 2011). The 
revised strategy included significant modifications. First, following lobbying by neo- 
conservative groups, there was a move from exclusively tackling ‘violent extremism’ 
to also combating ‘non- violent extremism’. Second, the revised strategy purported 
to address a wider variety of forms of extremism, including that emanating from the 
far right; although, as we shall see, the policy has always disproportionately targeted 
‘Islamist extremism’. Third, overall responsibility for Prevent was centralised in the 
Home Office, with community cohesion activities remaining with the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. Fourth, and not expressed in the formal 
strategy, a shift towards working covertly with Muslim civil society groups occurred. 
Following the failure of government counter- radicalisation measures to gain legit-
imacy among Muslim civil society, in 2012 the UK government adopted a policy 
of covertly funding Muslim civil society organisations that would politically align 
with state priorities as the statement below by the former British prime minister, 
Theresa May, shows:
Often it is more effective to be working through groups that are recognized 
as having a voice … rather than it being seen to be government trying to give 
a message. Indeed, it’s always better to be using those people to whom people 
look naturally to hear the message, rather than simply doing it as RICU itself 
(Intelligence and Security Committee 2012).
The Research Information and Communications Unit, based in the Home Office 
and referred to by Theresa May above, led these covert elements of Prevent, 
employing the services of a public relations company called Breakthrough Media 
to create social media campaigns in order to promote pro- government messaging 
(Massoumi and Miller 2019; Massoumi et al. 2019). RICU covertly supported, via 
Breakthrough Media, campaigns purporting to emanate from grassroots Muslim 
civil society groups challenging ‘extremism’ in local communities. One such cam-
paign was fronted by Families Against Stress and Terror, which describes itself as an 
independent organisation that offers ‘support to vulnerable families and individ-
uals’. Yet, in a leaked internal Office for Security and Counter- Terrorism document 
marked ‘not for public disclosure’, FAST’s ‘Families matter’ campaign is described 
as a ‘RICU product’ that has been ‘led and developed’ by FAST but ‘supported 
by … PR and online activity’ (Miller and Massoumi 2016). FAST is but one of 
many ostensibly grassroots organisations that play a role in counter- radicalisation 
initiatives, and that have been afforded discreet Home Office support (Hooper 
2017; Cobain et al. 2016). The covert nature of these initiatives creates uncertainty 
throughout Muslim civil society, as people are unaware which initiatives are linked 
to government and which are not.
In 2015, the Prevent programme was placed on a statutory footing, following 
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pay ‘due regard’ to ‘prevent people being drawn into terrorism’. Although Prevent 
in the public sector is supposed to be guided by the Prevent Duty Guidance (HM 
Government 2015a), in practice there exists uncertainty about if, how and when 
to implement it. This trajectory of the Prevent programme has been heavily 
influenced by neo- conservative think tanks with strongly defined neo- conservative 
viewpoints on issues such as religion, immigration, integration and terrorism. In 
Britain, neo- conservative organisations such as the Henry Jackson Society and 
Policy Exchange routinely lobby government and promote authoritarian, exclu-
sionist polices. Such think tanks have published a series of reports purporting to 
show ‘evidence’ of extremism among British Muslims – calling on government to 
sever links with particular individuals and groups and urging intensified surveil-
lance of Muslims. In addition to being morally dubious and socially retrogressive, 
the evidence presented for such calls is highly questionable. To give but one 
example, a report by the Policy Exchange was withdrawn by the think tank after 
the BBC established that receipts claiming to establish that ‘extremist’ literature 
was being sold in British Mosques had been forged (see Mills et al. 2011). There 
are numerous instances in which the ‘research’ of right- wing think- thanks alleging 
extremist activities by British Muslims has been challenged for being either 
inaccurate or highly exaggerated. The specific examples that have come to light 
signal broader concerns about the integrity of their research practices (Miller et al. 
2017). Mediating and endorsing Islamophobic discourses in the public sphere and 
attempting to influence security policy are, lamentably, embedded activities for 
many neo- conservative think tanks. For example, the Centre for Social Cohesion – 
later incorporated into the Henry Jackson Society – and Policy Exchange were at 
the forefront of pushing for the revision of the Prevent strategy to include ‘non- 
violent’ extremism. Following these mobilisation efforts, the Prevent policy was 
expanded to include ‘non- violent extremism’, with the Centre for Social Cohesion 
being cited no fewer than six times, indicating its role in influencing the formation 
of the policy. More recently, it was uncovered that the Home Office Extremism 
Analysis Unit – the body created to monitor extremism following the introduc-
tion of the Prevent Duty Guidance (2015) – was receiving data directly from the 
Henry Jackson Society in its efforts to identify extremists (Butt v Secretary of State 
for Home Department 2017). This demonstrates the extent to which non- accountable 
neo- conservative agencies have not only influenced the direction of the Prevent 
policy but also tangibly shaped its practical implementation. The range of oblique 
activities and practices undertaken by non- governmental actors acting outwith 
democratic protocols and procedures generates palpable concerns with regards to 
responsibility, scrutiny and accountability. The predominant focus of ideational 
activities in the public sphere for right- wing think tanks has been oriented towards 
expanding the nebulous concept of extremism and indexing it to Islam and 
Muslims. Such disingenuous activities have fuelled Islamophobic discourses and 
acted as a lever to lobby government to move ‘security’ policy in increasingly 
authoritarian directions. At the same time, Muslim public figures and legitimate 
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restricting and discouraging Muslim political participation in public life. This, 
coupled with the official counter- terrorism apparatus – an already powerful and 
largely unaccountable set of institutions  – targeting individuals considered as 
extremists and those apparently radicalised has had serious repercussions. Concepts 
such as extremism and radicalisation are imprecisely defined in official discourse, 
generating widespread uncertainty at the level of identification and intervention. 
The flexible fashion in which these concepts are operationalised in the state bur-
eaucracy, together with the routine practices of the police and other public servants, 
means that many thousands of people in the UK are now regarded as legitimate 
targets for suspicion, surveillance and intelligence- gathering. To this end, there is 
already a wide and deep body of evidence indicating that UK counter- terrorism 
policy has disproportionately affected and discriminated against Muslims (Qurashi 
2018; Massoumi et al. 2017; Kundnani 2015). Nested within Prevent – and designed 
to combat radicalisation – ‘Channel’ serves as but one example of this. Channel is 
the UK government’s pre- criminal ‘diversionary’ programme, which ‘provide[s] 
support for people vulnerable to being drawn into any form of terrorism’ (HM 
Government 2015b). Figures released under the Freedom of Information Act – 
and now routinely published by the Home Office – show that there has been a 
sharp increase in Channel referrals since the introduction of the Counter- 
Terrorism and Security Act and the Prevent Duty Guidance in 2015. Between July 
2015 and June 2016 there were 4,611 referrals – a 75 per cent increase on the 
previous year. Notably, of these cases some 2,311 were children under the age of 
18 (including 352 under nine years old) (Massoumi et al. 2017: 11). Subsequently, 
the figures have continued at a similar rate, meaning that on average 12 people a 
day are being referred to the programme. While the revised Prevent strategy 
purports to deal with all forms of terrorism, the large majority of referrals to 
Channel relate to suspicions of Islamist extremism: 65 per cent in 2015/ 16 and 61 
per cent in 2016/ 17. Alarmingly, from 2014 to 2016, young Muslims were 44 
times more likely to be referred to the Channel programme than individuals of 
other religions (Blakeley et al. 2019). Although there was an increase in referrals 
and Channel support decisions for right- wing extremism in 2017/ 18 (Islamist 
extremism referrals reported at 50 per cent, compared to 32 per cent for right- 
wing extremism, with Channel supporting 45 per cent of decisions for Islamist 
extremism and 44 per cent for right- wing extremism), the Prevent programme still 
disproportionately targets Muslims. Yet, despite apparent rising awareness of the 
threat presented by individuals and groups motivated by racism and Islamophobia, 
none of the RICU covert activity described above was directed towards the 
problem of right- wing extremism. Moreover, groups racialised as White are not 
universally implicated in right- wing extremism, in the way that Muslim groups 
have had their cultural beliefs and practices spuriously used as potential indicators 
for extremism or radicalisation. As empirical studies have illustrated, the imple-
mentation of undemocratic counter- terrorism measures has created widespread 
anxiety and uncertainty for young British Muslims, who have been subjected to 
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2018; Qurashi 2018; Kundnani 2009; Mythen et al. 2009). Examples of how this 
has transpired in practice are abundant. Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 
enabled the police to stop and search any person or vehicle without any require-
ment for ‘reasonable suspicion’. Asians and Blacks were disproportionately targeted 
compared with Whites, with Asians being over six times more likely to be stopped 
and searched, and Black people on average almost eight times more likely 
(Massoumi et al. 2017: 8). In January 2010, Section 44 was declared unlawful by 
the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Gillan and Quinton v UK. 
The court noted in its judgement that ‘none of the many thousands of searches has 
ever resulted in conviction of a terrorism offence’ (Gillan and Quinton v UK, 
2010: para. 148). Further, Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 sanctions draco-
nian powers which apply to port and airport border controls allowing the detain-
ment of individuals for up to nine hours to conduct searches of their person, 
allowing belongings to be seized for up to seven days. Those detained under 
Schedule 7 have fewer legal rights than criminal suspects: they are not entitled to 
a publicly- funded lawyer, are obliged to answer questions and, if detained at a 
police station, to provide biometric data, including fingerprints and DNA – all 
without a requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion’ (Massoumi et al. 2017: 9). While 
the religion of those detained under Schedule 7 is not recorded in official statistics, 
publicly available figures on the ethnicity of those examined or detained indicate 
that individuals of Pakistani ethnicity are over 150 times more likely to be detained 
under Schedule 7 than White British citizens (Massoumi et al. 2017: 10). As flagged 
earlier, forms of state control and para- statal involvement in ideational projects of 
regulation and division underscore the ways in which uncertainty connects to 
issues of governance and accountability, and also index to the operation of power 
and the enactment of political priorities.
All of this suggests that, when we think about concrete examples where uncer-
tainty seems rife, it is worth asking whether the issues in front of us can be viewed 
through a different lens and/ or interpreted in a different way. Uncertainty is often 
associated with unknowns and futurity, but this often obscures tangible and observ-
able phenomena. For example, how might our understanding of a given situation 
change if we were not to use the optic of uncertainty and risk, but instead to use that 
of harm and injustice? As the long- standing discrimination faced by British Muslims 
in the UK illustrates, history, dominant ideologies and institutionalised prejudice 
matter. To this end, it is vital to stress that, while the state may formally aver that it is 
the guardian of ‘public’ security, in practice the role of state intelligence and surveil-
lance agencies in producing insecurity for certain individuals and groups is evident.
Survivors of structural violence: emotion, trust and the politics 
of accountability
Historical and temporal factors are also present when thinking about the consequences 
of political and religiously motivated violence, as Will McGowan shows in this final 
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and cultural – received by those living in the aftermath of such violence. In this 
regard, the shooting of innocent protestors by the British Army in 1972 in Ireland 
on ‘Bloody Sunday’ and the coordinated bombing of London’s transport system in 
the 2005 ‘7/ 7’ attacks offer contrasting points of reference. In making sense of these 
various pasts in the present, the two respective ‘survivor groups’ have had both to 
negotiate and traverse life since these tragic events, but in quite different ways. While 
the 7/ 7 attacks were subject to close scrutiny by the state – including profiling of 
the perpetrators, transparent and widely publicised inquests and post- event analysis 
for the emergency and security services – the survivors of Bloody Sunday have 
spent more than four decades seeking justice through successive inquiries. Indeed, 
it was not until 2010 that an official apology was received from the British prime 
minister and, more recently, a case for prosecution belatedly brought against one of 
the British soldiers involved in the incident. The information made available to the 
public following 7/ 7 provided at least a satisfactory ‘completeness’ of knowledge 
about how their loved ones were killed and the contextual factors surrounding the 
event. No such completeness was available to Bloody Sunday survivors. Within the 
Catholic community of Derry, it was not uncertainty that beset efforts to expose 
the abuses and persecution they faced, or to establish what took place at that Civil 
Rights march. Instead, their ability to make public those harms and to ensure an 
accurate and just recording of them has meant that survivors and campaigners have 
had perpetually to look back on events retrospectively, with little chance of ‘moving 
on’ with life as before.
Locating uncertainty within these two examples becomes very much a ‘tale of 
two tragedies’: with one in which knowledge enables at least the potential for pro-
spective and future recovery, and the other in which the cultural and legal prece-
dent of remembering history displaces any such hopes for transcending its impacts 
within living memory. Contemporary political conditions have also intermingled 
with these survivors’ sense of collective identity and ontological security differ-
entially, with uncertainty, fears and hypothetical resolutions relating to Brexit and 
the Irish border looming ever larger. The relationship between politics, emotion, 
(non)knowledge and power in such landmark cases is thus contingent upon the 
state’s arbitration of them. Hannah Arendt’s (1958: 237) oft- cited analysis of polit-
ical promises usefully illuminates this relationship further:
The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, 
is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises … binding oneself 
through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the 
future is by definition, islands of security without which not even con-
tinuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships 
between men [sic].
In the immediate aftermath of catastrophe or injustice, such events again raise 
pressing questions about accountability and democracy, partly because of the 
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relationship Arendt highlights between those in positions of power and the demos 
to whom they make promises. When these promises are broken  – as they are 
with alarming frequency  – trust is not only eroded:  it is difficult to win back. 
However, looking beyond specific actions and reactions concerning individuals, 
Arendt’s analysis of uncertainty merits closer attention in relation to the relation-
ship between governance, emotion and trust. Unlike Arendt’s remedy for unpre-
dictability, which provides islands of security, today’s political landscape presents 
us with insecurity as an unceasing and inevitable feature of social, economic and 
political life. Catastrophe, vulnerability and surprise perpetually await us and must 
be embraced; preparation to deal with the jolts and shocks generated by twenty- 
first century turbo- capitalism must be prioritised, and represent something of an 
emotional retraining exercise. As Mark Neocleous (2012: 188) posits, the nature 
of today’s security politics might be epitomised in the maxim: ‘don’t be scared, be 
prepared’. The actual emotions engendered under such political conditions – the 
preponderance of which are likely to be negative ones, such as fear and anger – may 
encourage an inward- turning and acquiescent citizenry. Whether or not this is the 
case, they provide no basis for long- term stability, or happiness.
Four concluding provocations
In drawing the chapter to a close, it has been our intention to deploy concrete 
examples of the ways in which problems of uncertainty have an impact upon 
‘security’ in its many guises, from policy and practice to the ontological and 
emotional. Having discussed several problematiques that arise when we seek 
to engage in debates about uncertainty in the context of security, we wish to 
end by offering up four caveats that serve as simultaneous provocations. First, 
it is our contention that, rather than analysing uncertainty as a purely abstract 
concept, we need to situate it in specific contexts of knowledge and grounded 
cultural milieu. The dangers of presentism – through which histories of uncer-
tainty might become masked – are obvious in this regard. Second, having iden-
tified a set of specific practices to focus on, it is important to remain alert to the 
different characteristics of uncertainty, and to speak consistently about particular 
strands across a chosen set of observations. Third, as we have demonstrated, it is 
important to be aware of – and alert to – the pursuit of narrow, sectoral interests 
that may lurk beneath the veil that uncertainty enables. Fourth, and relatedly, 
we would counsel against ‘uncertainty imperialism’, whereby the term becomes 
used as a catch- all lingua franca that is devoid of specificity. Mirroring academic 
overuse of ‘risk’ as an heuristic device, if we are loose in bandying about the 
discourse of ‘uncertainty’ there is a palpable danger of catachresis. While theor-
etically exploring the constitution of uncertainty adds to the corpus of academic 
knowledge, as we have intimated, overstretching its explanatory potential may 
serve to shroud rather than elucidate more pressing and critical analyses of power 
relations, inequalities and injustices.
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